Архив меток: oecd

eia.gov: Газовый баланс Европы и США


earlywarn: Добыча, потребление и цена нефти

Non-OPEC Liquid Fuel Production Flat in 2011-2012

This is based on EIA data for all-liquids through October 2012.

OECD Oil Consumption

Oil Supply Flatness Continues

Oil Prices

ОПЕК: World Oil Outlook 2012. Main assumptions

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Для России прогнозируют снижение численности населения и одновременно экономический рост. Хороший рост, больше, чем в ОЭСР.

ОПЕК: World Oil Outlook 2012. Executive summary

World Oil Outlook 2012

Oil price assumption slightly higher than in the previous WOO
This year it is assumed that the OPEC Reference Basket (ORB) nominal price remains at an average of $100/b over the medium-term, before rising with inflation to reach $120/b by 2025. Longer term, real prices are set to rise slightly and nominal prices thereby reach $155/b by 2035.

Short- and medium-term economic growth assumptions reflect Euro-zone crisis
Short-term economic growth rates see a downward adjustment compared to the WOO 2011. The estimate for the 2012 global economic growth rate is around 1% lower than assumed previously. OECD Europe gross domestic product (GDP) remains approximately flat in 2012, compared to the WOO 2011 expected growth rate of 1.9%. The impact of the Euro-zone crisis is expected to continue to be felt in Europe in 2013, which has led to an assumed growth rate of just 0.5% for OECD Europe in that year. The impact is also felt elsewhere. The European Union (EU) contributes to around a fifth of global GDP and is the most important trading partner to many large emerging economies, such as China. However, it is assumed that monetary and fiscal measures, accompanied by budget-deficit reduction measures, including austerity, as well as growth-inducing incentives, will help the Euro-zone to gradually improve its economic prospects and by 2015 return to more normal growth patterns, with positive impacts on the global stage.

Growing global population, but shrinking working-age strata in many countries

Long-term economic growth averages 3.4% per annum
Long-term economic growth rate assumptions reflect demographic trends, as well as progressively smaller rates of productivity improvement. Over the period 2012–2035, long-term economic growth rates average 3.4% per annum (p.a.). By 2035, the Chinese economy will be larger than any other country and even larger than entire regions within the OECD, such as America and Europe. India, which in 2010 accounted for 5% of global GDP, rises to 11% by 2035 and will then have a larger economy than the whole OECD Asia-Pacific region. Within ten years, India is expected to be growing faster than China, partly due to demographic trends that reduce the dependency rate and raise the savings ratio, thus supporting investment. The share of developing Asian countries in the world’s economic activity rises in the Reference Case from 26% in 2010 to 43% by 2035.

The Reference Case considers only current policies

Energy demand in the Reference Case increases by 54% over the period 2010–2035

Over the period 2010–2035, primary energy demand in the Reference Case increases by 54%. Fossil fuels, currently accounting for 87% of this, will still make up 82% of the global total by 2035.

However, towards the end of the projection period, coal use in the Reference Case reaches similar levels as that of oil, with oil’s share having fallen from 35% in 2010 to 27% by 2035. Natural gas use will rise at faster rates than either coal or oil, both in percentage terms and quantities, with its share rising from 23% to 26%.

Shale gas has large potential, but mainly in the US for now
Total shale gas production in the US jumped from 15 billion cubic feet a day (bcf/d) in 2010 to 25 bcf/d in 2012. Replicating the success of US shale gas development internationally requires addressing many key challenges including water shortages, a lack of infrastructure, higher population densities, a shortage of skilled labour and the NIMBY effect.

Substantial coal reserves, but prospects could be affected by carbon constraints
In terms of calorific value, there are more coal reserves than the sum of oil and gas reserves. At the end of 2010, the highest level of reserves by far was in the US, which, together with Russia, China, India and Australia, account for three-quarters of global reserves. Coal was the fastest growing fossil fuel over the last ten years.

Fukushima impact on nuclear limited to some OECD countries
Global nuclear energy expands in the Reference Case at an average rate of 1.7% p.a., with a share of 6% in 2035, similar to today.

Medium-term oil demand projections revised downwards
The Reference Case now foresees demand reaching 92.9 mb/d by 2016, a downward revision of over 1 mb/d compared to the WOO 2011. Over the period 2011–2016, OECD oil demand declines each year, having peaked in 2005. Around 70% of the medium-term increase of 5.1 mb/d comes from developing Asia.

Long-term to 2035, oil demand grows to 107.3 mb/d

Long-term oil demand prospects have not only been affected by the medium-term downward revisions, but by higher oil prices too. Additionally, the implications of technological developments and deployment, especially in the transportation sector, also contribute to some downward long-term revision. In the Reference Case, demand increases by over 20 mb/d for the period 2010–2035, reaching 107.3 mb/d by 2035. The long-term sees a steady decline in demand
in all OECD regions. Fully 87% of the global demand increase is in developing Asia, where demand reaches 90% of that of the OECD by 2035. Global demand in 2035 is more than 2 mb/d lower than in the WOO 2011

Transportation sector is the main source of growth
Growth in oil demand since 1980 has been dominated by transportation use – mainly road transportation, but also aviation, internal waterways and international marine. Over the past three decades, the average annual growth in OECD and non-OECD countries has been very similar, each around 0.3 mboe/d. At the global level, transportation is expected to continue to dominate growth over the projected period. Nonetheless, this increase will come only from non-OECD countries, three-quarters of which stem from the transportation sector. In contrast to both OECD and Eurasian countries, developing countries also see a rise in oil use in other sectors (petrochemicals, residential/commercial/agriculture, other industrial uses). However, all regions will see the small amount of oil that is still used for electricity generation decline in the future.

Demand for OPEC crude stays essentially flat over the medium-term
the medium-term Reference Case outlook sees growth in non-OPEC liquids supply over 2011–2016. It rises by over 4 mb/d, mainly from shale oil in the US, Canadian oil sands, and crude oil from the Caspian and Brazil. These compensate for expected declines elsewhere. For example, combined supply from OECD Europe and Mexico falls by close to 1 mb/d over this period. As with earlier Reference Cases, a rise in OPEC natural gas liquids (NGLs) is expected over the medium-term, increasing from 5.2 mb/d in 2011 to 6.4 mb/d in 2016. However, total OPEC liquids supply rises. OPEC crude oil spare capacity is expected to exceed 5 mb/d as early as 2013/14.

OPEC is investing heavily
According to the latest list of upstream projects in the OPEC Secretariat’s database, Member Countries are undertaking or planning around 116 development projects during the five-year period 2012–2016. This corresponds to an estimated investment of about $270 billion.

Large diversity of liquids supply sources over the long-term

Total non-OPEC liquids supply in the long-term increases strongly, by more than 10 mb/d over these years: supply increases in crude and NGLs from the Caspian, Russia, Brazil and US shale oil, as well as steady increases in biofuels and oil sands, are far stronger than declines elsewhere. Non-OPEC supply from Canadian oil sands and biofuels in the US, Europe and Brazil continues to grow strongly, by close to 11 mb/d.Global NGLs supply rises by close to 7 mb/d over these years. These developments mean that OPEC crude supply needs to rise in the Reference Case, but at a modest rate: by 2035, it would need to be just 35 mb/d, around 5 mb/d higher than in 2010. It means the share of OPEC crude in global liquids supply remains approximately constant, at around 32%, throughout the whole period.

Shale oil represents a large change to the supply picture
In previous WOO Reference Cases, no significant shale oil contribution to liquids supply was envisaged. This year a rise in the importance of shale oil is expected. Supply from Bakken, Eagle Ford and Niobrara in the US is already over 1 mb/d, and despite severe decline rates, emerging forecasts now see oil shale supply rising rapidly. In the Reference Case, an estimate of 2 mb/d and 3 mb/d for shale oil is assumed to emerge by 2020 and 2035, respectively. Lower growth after 2020 is justified by the fact that the best shale oil plays will be tapped first. Their contribution in the medium-term will continue to come only from North America. In the longer term, however, modest contributions might also come from other parts of the world.

Huge investments for additional net capacity, but not markedly different from past
Over the period 2011–2035, upstream investment requirements for additional capacity amount to $4.2 trillion in 2011 dollars. Much of the investment needed is to compensate for natural declines in fields that are currently producing oil.

Alternative scenarios stress major demand uncertainties for OPEC crude

The first scenario, Lower Economic Growth (LEG), looks at the impact of lower economic growth, both in the medium-term, largely as a result of the on-going Euro-zone debt crisis and the Chinese growth slowdown, but also in the longer term. A second scenario, Higher Economic Growth (HEG), acknowledges that there is indeed upside potential for economic growth and explores what this could imply for OPEC oil. And the third scenario, Liquids Supply Surge (LSS), estimates the possible impact upon OPEC crude if the overall supply of liquids other than OPEC crude is higher than estimated in the Reference Case.

By 2035, the expectations for OPEC crude are very similar across the downside risk scenarios, at 25–26 mb/d, while the HEG scenario sees the need for OPEC crude at over 43 mb/d. The dramatic supply fall in the downside scenarios, as well as the rapid increase in the HEG scenario may not be sustainable.

Challenges exist also in the downstream, where transport fuels drive future demand structure

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Далее в executive summary прогнозы по нефтепереработке

IEA: World Energy Outlook 2012. Presentation to the press


WEO Publications 2008-1994

BP Energy Outlook 2030. Транспорт

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Влияние биотоплива и газ к 20130 будет незначительно

BP Energy Outlook 2030. Нефть, газ, конденсат

BP Energy Outlook 2030. Global energy trends


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Ключевые моменты
— Рост потребления энергии в мире в раза
— Основной рост потребления энергии вне ОЭСР (Китай и Индия)
— Падение потребления нефти и угля в ОЭСР при росте потребления газа и возобновляемых источников энергии (ВИЭ) (не гидро)
— В мире увеличение потребления газа, угля, ВИЭ
— Рост потребления: на транспорте — нефти; в промышленности — электричества, газа, угля
— Увеличение объема ВИЭ в электрогенерации, основной объем — уголь и газ.
— Энергоинтенсивность в Индии всегда будет ниже, чем в Китае. Сомнительная радость для Индии

ExxonMobil’s Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040. Supply, Global trade, Energy evolution, Data

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Пик традиционной нефти уже пройден в районе 2005 г.
Конденсат > Глубоководная нефть > нефтяные пески > Tight oil = биотопливо

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Основной прирост добычи УВ-жидкостей в Северной Америке: конденсат, нефтяные пески, глубоководная нефть, Tight oil. Основная добыча УВ-жидкостей ожидается на Ближнем Востоке, Латинской и Северной Америке

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Более четверти мировой газодобычи будет приходиться на нетрадиционный газ. Сомнительно
Северная Америка: 80% добычи будет составлять нетрадиционный газ. Сомнительно весьма

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Картинка по данным IEA.org. Мировые ресурсы газ надо делить на два.
Делить на два для обеих Америк, Европы, Африки. Для тихоокеанской Азии (Китай+Япония) надо делить на три.

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Рост потребления газа на 65%, ядерной энергии почти в 2 раза, в 5 раз Ветра-Солнца-Биотплива.

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Торговля нефтью в нынешней пропорции, торговля газом вырастет приблизительно в 2 раза

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На карте выделены три главных потребителя: тихоокеанская Азия, Северная Америка, Европа.
В Северной Америке к 2025 г. ожидают уже появления экспорта.

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Возрастание доли газа и ядерной энергии


ExxonMobil’s Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040. Industrial, Electricity generation


ExxonMobil’s Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040. Residential/commercial, Transportation


ExxonMobil’s Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040. Global fundamentals


eia.gov: Short-term energy outlook, World Liquid Fuels


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Диаграмма World Crude Oil and Liquid Fuels Production Growth
2012 г. — наибольший прирост добычи связан с ОПЕК.

Non-OPEC Crude Oil and Liquid Fuels Production Growth
наибольший рост в 2011-2013 будет в США и Канаде, наибольший спад в Великобритании.

graphoilogy.com: The Non OECD Supply Impact on Oil Prices

The Non-OPEC supply as a share of the World production now at 25% has been steadily decreasing since 2000 and is near its lowest point since the late 70s:

Figure 1. World share of total liquid production . Sources: BP and EIA.

An interesting correlation, the Non-OPEC supply as a share of the World production is highly correlated with oil prices since 1965:

Figure 2. Non OECD World share of total liquid production and real oil prices. Sources: BP, EIA, FRED.

Prices are low when the share is below 50% which was the case in the 90s. So it seems to imply that when the world supply is too dependent on Non OECD supply (which includes OPEC producers), we then get high oil prices.

Figure 3. Same as Fig. 2 but as a scatter plot. The red circle indicates February 2012.

or better in the log-domain:

One can then derive the oil price elasticity of Non-OPEC supply:


so an increase of 10% in the Non OECD Share of total production will produce a 150% jump in oil prices. One solution to reduce prices is for the OECD to increase supply which seems to be happening with strong supply growth coming from the US (a 1 Mb/d increase in OECD supply with then decrease prices by about 15%) . Of course, other factors are influencing prices, consumption growth for instance.