Архив меток: карта административная

Национальный Атлас России

национальныйатлас.рф
Том 1 — «Общая характеристика территории» национальныйатлас.рф/cd1/territory.html
Том 2 — «Природа. Экология» национальныйатлас.рф/cd2/index.html
Том 3 — «Население. Экономика» национальныйатлас.рф/cd3/index.html

геологические карты, карты полезных ископаемых, нефтяной, газовой, горнодобывающей промышленности

Приобретение http://journal.cgkipd.ru/product/4967

Реклама

eia.gov: United Arab Emirates

A member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 1967, the UAE is one of the most significant oil producers in the world. According to Oil & Gas Journal 2012 estimates, the UAE holds the seventh-largest proved reserves of oil at 97.8 billion barrels, with the majority of reserves located in Abu Dhabi (approximately 94 percent). The other six emirates combined account for just 6 percent of the UAE’s crude oil reserves, led by Dubai with approximately 4 billion barrels. Production of these resources is dominated by the state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) in partnership with a few large international oil companies under long-term concessions

The likelihood of further major discoveries in the UAE is low, but enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques are being successfully utilized to increase the extraction rates of the UAE’s mature oil fields, and the recovery of oil prices following the global financial crisis will help maintain the commercial viability of such endeavors. Leaders in the UAE hope to increase crude oil production to 3.5 million bbl/d over the next few years, and levels are expected to approach 3 million bbl/d by the end of 2012.

In Abu Dhabi, contract structures are based on long-term, production-sharing agreements between the state-run ADNOC and private actors (primarily large international oil companies), with the state required to hold a majority share in all projects. With the exceptions of Dubai and Sharjah—which both have service contracts to manage their declining reserves—the smaller Emirates all utilize some form of production-sharing agreements similar to those found in Abu Dhabi. Major international oil companies involved in the oil and gas sector in the UAE include British Petroleum, Shell, Total, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum—which in 2008 secured the first new concession offered by the UAE in more than 20 years.

Nevertheless, recent exploration has not yielded any significant discoveries of crude oil. What it lacks in new discoveries, however, it makes up for with an emphasis on EOR techniques designed to extend the lifespan of the Emirates’ existing oil fields. By improving the recovery rates at those fields, such techniques helped the UAE to nearly double the proved reserves in Abu Dhabi over the last decade-plus

The Zakum system—the third-largest oil system in the Middle East and the fourth-largest in the world—is the center of the UAE’s oil industry, accounting for nearly 30 percent of the country’s total production in 2010. The Upper Zakum field is run by the ZADCO—which is owned by ADNOC (72 percent share) and ExxonMobil (28 percent)—and currently produces 520,000 bbl/d. In July 2012 ZADCO awarded an $800-million engineering, procurement, and construction contract to Abu Dhabi’s National Petroleum Construction Company—along with French firm Technip—with the goal of expanding production to 750,000 bbl/d by 2016. The Lower Zakum field—operated by the Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company (ADMA-OPCO)—is also being expanded, with production expected to reach 425,000 bbl/d; up from the 300,000 bbl/d it currently produces.

Other significant fields include the Bu Hasa (600,000 bbl/d), Ghasha-Butini (up to 300,000 bbl/d by year-end 2012), Murban Bab (320,000 bbl/d), and the Sahil, Asab, and Shah (SAS) fields (385,000 bbl/d), all located in Abu Dhabi. Dubai and Sharjah also have producing basins, but nothing approaching the scale of those found in Abu Dhabi. The largest fields in those Emirates are the Fateh-Southwest Fateh-Falah fields (80,000 bbl/d) operated by the Dubai Petroleum Establishment and the Mubarak field (8,000 bbl/d) operated by Crescent Petroleum in Sharjah.

With limited prospects for major discoveries, production increases in the UAE will come almost exclusively from EOR techniques in Abu Dhabi’s existing oil fields. Nevertheless, the government is pursuing production capacity of 3.5 million bbl/d in 2018 through the investment of $60 billion in Abu Dhabi’s oil sector. ADCO—which oversees onshore operations in the emirate—plans to increase production in the Bu Hasa, Bab, and SAS fields over the coming years, with increases expected to approach 200,000 bbl/d as soon as 2014. Some newer fields will also contribute to production gains: Qusahwira is targeted to provide an additional 30,000 bbl/d by the end of 2012 and another 20,000 bbl/d by 2016 (to 90,000 bbl/d), while the Bida al-Qemzan field could add 75,000 bbl/d by 2016 bringing it to 300,000 bbl/d overall.

Smaller offshore fields like the Nasr, Umm Lulu, and Umm Shaif are also the target of increased investment, with ADMA-OPCO seeking to maintain production levels at the Umm Shaif field at 280,000 bbl/d and attempting to bring the combined production of the Nasr and Umm Lulu fields up to 170,000 bbl/d as soon as 2018. Exploration and production in the other Emirates is limited, with reserves nearly exhausted and the cost of recovery continuing to climb.

The newest export pipeline, The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP), runs 230 miles from Habshan to Fujairah and began operations in June 2012. This pipeline gives the UAE a direct link from the rich fields of its western desert to the Gulf of Oman, and from there to global markets. This provides the UAE—and global markets—a strategic alternative to the problematic Strait of Hormuz, which is the world’s most important energy chokepoint (see EIA’s World Oil Transit Chokepoints analysis brief). In 2011 17 million bbl/d of crude oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz, which was almost 20 percent of the world’s traded oil and 35 percent of all seaborne-traded oil.

The inauguration of the ADCOP is the most significant development in the UAE’s midstream profile to date. With a capacity of 1.5 million bbl/d—and expectations of that figure reaching 1.8 million bbl/d in the near future—this pipeline provides the UAE with the ability to export close to 75 percent of its daily production without passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC)—owned by the government of Abu Dhabi—led the pipeline project, and it will be operated by ADCO.

Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP)


http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TC

eia.gov: Вьетнам, Country Analysis Brief

Sector Organization

Vietnam’s oil sector is dominated by the state-owned Vietnam Oil & Gas Corporation (PetroVietnam), essentially both the operator and regulator in the industry. PetroVietnam is under the authority of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and contributes about a quarter of the state budget. PetroVietnam typically seeks foreign investment to assist in some of the more capital-intensive hydrocarbon developments. All oil production in the country is carried out by PetroVietnam’s upstream subsidiary, PetroVietnam Exploration and Production (PVEP), or through joint-ventures (JVs) or production sharing contracts (PSCs), in which the national oil company (NOC) has at least a 20 percent equity interest. Foreign companies typically negotiate directly with PVEP for upstream licenses of major fields in Vietnam, and all awards must receive approval from the Oil and Gas Department of the Prime Minister. PetroVietnam is also involved in Vietnam’s downstream oil sector through various subsidiaries, such as Petechim and PetroVietnam Oil Processing and Distribution Company (PV Oil). The Vietnamese government began to privatize the NOC’s non-oil related business units in 2006 as part of its goal to raise capital for upstream and downstream projects and increase operational efficiency, although the state plans to retain its hydrocarbon activities. PetroVietnam has expanded its activities overseas and holds upstream equity stakes in 15 countries. As of 2011, the NOC plans to spend over $2.3 billion to develop 25 petroleum projects in the former Soviet Union countries and Latin America.

Russian energy companies are expanding their presence in Vietnam as the two countries seek to form strategic partnerships and expand their overseas equity and production. The largest oil-producing company in Vietnam is Vietsovpetro (VSP), a long-standing joint venture between PetroVietnam and Zarubezhneft of Russia, which continues to operate the Bach Ho, Rong, and Rong South-East oilfields. The two firms agreed to extend the partnership for another 20 years starting in 2011. Other important Russian players in Vietnam, such as TNK-BP, Lukoil, and Gazprom, have forged deals for equity stakes in the Nam Con Son and Song Hong basins. TNK-BP acquired all of BP’s original stakes in Vietnam including a 35-percent equity stake in Nam Con Son basin’s Block 06-1, containing Lan Do, one of the largest gas field in Vietnam, and a 33-percent share of the Nam Con Son gas pipeline.

PetroVietnam also has formed partnerships with several other international oil companies (IOCs), NOCs, and smaller independent energy companies including the following: ExxonMobil, Chevron, BHP Billiton, Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC), Total, India’s ONGC, Malaysia’s Petronas, Nippon Oil of Japan, Talisman, Thailand’s PTTEP, Premier Oil, SOCO International, and Neon Energy. After a competitive bid in 2011, ConocoPhillips divested its assets in Blocks 15-1 and 15-2 of the Cuu Long basin and the Nam Con Son pipeline to Perenco, a French IOC, for US$1.29 billion.

Petrolimex is the primary company charged with importing and distributing petroleum products in Vietnam and accounts for about 60 percent of the country’s total petroleum distribution market. Petrolimex also operates 300 miles of petroleum product pipelines, although much of the country’s fuel supply is transported by road. Two other state-owned fuel oil distributors in Vietnam are PV Oil and Saigon Petro. There are plans to eventually sell equity stakes in Petrolimex and provide greater competition for the domestic market. So far, only 3 percent of the company’s shares were sold off in a partial privatization to Vietnamese buyers.

Regulatory Environment

Vietnam’s energy policy objectives, outlined in the National Strategy for Energy Development, established in 2007, seeks to ensure energy supply security for the country’s rapidly growing domestic demand. Vietnam’s recent reforms in the upstream sector are intended to pave the way for exploration of new offshore basins and more technically challenging fields by encouraging foreign investment. PetroVietnam directly negotiates with foreign firms on any new exploration area and any fields relinquished by other companies. In addition to direct negotiations with foreign firms for upstream contracts, Vietnam has increased the frequency of formal international licensing rounds since 2004. Several new regulations introduced in 2009-10 clarified the process for investment and outlined bidding round regulations. For instance, the Government of Vietnam (GoV) passed recent legislation providing greater contract flexibility by allowing domestic and foreign firms to extend exploration contracts past the project deadlines.

Currently, Vietnam maintains wholesale and retail oil prices lower than international oil market prices to sustain a growing economy, keep inflation from rising, and protect consumers, resulting in revenue losses for oil distributors. Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance attempts to manage these losses through tools such as import tax and tariff reductions and the Fuel Price Stabilization Fund, which allows distributors to withdraw cash. In times of high crude oil prices, though, the fund’s resources tend to diminish. Vietnam intends to gradually roll back fuel subsidies in the oil and natural gas sector and use market-based pricing in order to alleviate state budget strains in times of high international oil prices. Limited reform under Decree 84 allows fuel retailers to increase oil prices by 7 percent when international prices fluctuate by the same rate within a 30-day period, but the government typically tries to maintain lower prices for consumers and uses this measure as a last resort to reverse distributors’ revenue losses.

When crude oil prices escalated in 2010, Vietnam reduced oil product import tariffs several times until early 2012, when the government slashed duties on gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel to zero. Also, the government resorted to boosting retail oil product prices by a total of 34 percent in 2011, and by an additional 12 percent in March 2012.

Exploration and Production
One of the most active areas for ongoing exploration and production activities in Vietnam is the offshore Cuu Long Basin. Vietnam’s oil production has decreased over the last seven years primarily as a result of declining output at the Bach Ho (White Tiger) field, which accounts for about half of the country’s crude oil production. After reaching peak output of 263,000 bbl/d in 2003, the field’s production dropped to an average 92,000 bbl/d in early 2011. It is expected that Bach Ho’s production decline rate will range from 20,000 bbl/d to 25,000 bbl/d through 2014. Vietsovpetro intends to boost oil production by using water injection to stem declines of aging fields and by investing $7 billion on exploration activities over the next five years.

Several new projects have come online in the last three years, offsetting declines at Bach Ho and other mature oil fields. Nonetheless, most of Vietnam’s other developments are from small fields with peak production plateaus of three years. Two key developments in Cuu Long Basin’s Block 15-1 are the Su Tu Den (Black Lion) and Su Tu Vang (Golden Lion) fields that produced a combined 100,000 bbl/d of oil in 2011. The field operator, Cuu Long Joint Operating Company (CLJOC), includes PetroVietnam (50 percent), Perenco — formerly ConocoPhillips’ share (23.25 percent), KNOC (14.25 percent), SK Corp. (9 percent), and Geopetrol (3.5 percent). Su Tu Den and Su Tu Vang came online in 2003 and 2008, respectively. Su Tu Vang is currently Vietnam’s second largest oilfield, producing around 70,000 bbl/d. Both fields have boosted production within Cuu Long basin, helping to offset declining Bach Ho production. CLJOC anticipates bringing on more production in Block 15-1 at bordering fields such as Su Tu Trang (White Lion) and Su Tu Nau (Brown Lion) between 2012 and 2015. According to consortium partner KNOC, recoverable reserves from the 4 new fields are 621 million barrels.

Besides developments in Block 15-1, several other JVs are undertaking significant exploration activity and bringing on several fields in the Cuu Long Basin. The Vietnam-Russia-Japan Petroleum Company launched the Doi Moi (South Dragon) field in 2010, producing 32,000 bbl/d and continues drilling surrounding developments. The Hoang Long JV operates the more sizeable Te Giac Trang (White Rhino) field, which came online in 2011 and has 55,000 bbl/d of peak capacity. Other smaller fields such as Hai Su Trang (White Sea lion) and Hai Su Den (Black Sea lion) are targeted to start production in 2013.

There are also extensive exploration and development activities ongoing in the Nam Con Son and Malay basins. The Nam Con Son basin, located south of the Cuu Long basin, is estimated to account for about 20 percent of Vietnam’s hydrocarbon resources (4.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent). Vietnam launched production from the 25,000 bbl/d Chim Sao (Blackbird) field in 2011. Vietnam also receives about 27,000 bbl/d of oil from the shared PM-3 Commercial Arrangement Area between Vietnam and Malaysia.

Licensing Rounds
Vietnam held its first licensing round in 2004, although the offers did not receive significant attention from international oil companies. Vietnam launched the second bidding round in 2007 with improved terms for potential investors, hoping to garner interest from IOCs in order to draw on their superior technical expertise. This round included 7 blocks in technically difficult exploration areas in the Song Hong and Phu Khanh basins in northern and central Vietnam. A limited bidding round was held in 2008 for 7 blocks and subsequently signed 4 PSCs were signed. Between 2009 and 2010, another 19 PSCs were signed on an ad hoc basis.

The fourth international round, which began in the latter half of 2011, includes blocks from the gas-rich Nam Con Son, Phu Quoc, and Malay-Thochu basins. PetroVietnam intends to award exploration licenses for 9 blocks in the offshore basin by mid-2012. Although all of the fields are located close to the Spratly Islands, where China has contesting interests, China has not opposed exploration of the basins. Four of the blocks were retendered after previous operators relinquished rights. Only three of the blocks are in unexplored areas.
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=VM&trk=wn

Overlapping EEZ Claims and Oil Fields

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_China_Sea/SouthChinaSeaTerritorialIssues.html

South China Sea Islands – University of Texas

Spratly Islands – U of Texas

Map 1: Full allocation of the SCS without consideration of Spratlys or Paracels.

Map 2: Full allocation of the SCS taking into account ownership of the Paracels.

Map 3: 200 mile boundaries without consideration of the Spratlys or Paracels.

Map 4: 200 mile boundaries taking into account ownership of the Paracels.

Territorial Claims in the south China Sea – R.B. Cribb

Spratly Islands – Conflicting Claims, SCS WWW VL

http://www.southchinasea.org/category/mpas/territorial-claims/

Россия ищет свой курс в Южно-Китайском море

Вооруженные силы США и Филиппин начали вчера крупные совместные учения вблизи спорных районов Южно-Китайского моря, на которые претендует Китай. Несмотря на заверения военного командования США, что маневры не направлены против КНР, эксперты считают учения частью новой азиатско-тихоокеанской доктрины Вашингтона, направленной на сдерживание растущего влияния Пекина. В разгорающиеся споры о принадлежности богатых энергоресурсами районов Южно-Китайского моря впервые оказалась втянута и Россия.

Стартовавшие на острове Палаван и в прилегающих к нему районах учения «Баликатан» («Плечом к плечу») продлятся до 27 апреля. Около 7 тыс. военнослужащих США и Филиппин будут отражать атаки условных террористов, пытающихся захватить находящиеся в море нефтегазовые объекты. Помимо американских и филиппинских военнослужащих в учениях примут участие военные Австралии, Японии и Южной Кореи.

«Нет никаких оснований полагать, что наши действия могут кому-то угрожать. Наша задача — научиться реагировать на возникающие угрозы и вызовы»,— заявил представитель командования США Кертис Хилл, отвечая на вопрос, могут ли учения «Баликатан» быть восприняты Пекином как угроза его безопасности. Ранее подобные маневры неизменно вызывали болезненную реакцию КНР, рассматривающей их как попытки дестабилизации в регионе с участием США.

На этот раз учения «Баликатан» совпали с обострением давнего территориального спора между Филиппинами и КНР, который на прошлой неделе едва не привел к вооруженному конфликту. Инцидент с участием кораблей ВМС Филиппин и катеров береговой охраны КНР произошел в Южно-Китайском море у рифа Скарборо, находящегося под филиппинской юрисдикцией, оспариваемой Пекином (китайское название рифа — остров Хуанъянь). Поводом для конфликта стала попытка задержания флагманом ВМС Филиппин — эсминцем «Грегорио де Пилар», недавно приобретенным у США,— восьми китайских рыболовецких шхун. Арестовать китайских моряков, уличенных в браконьерстве кораллов, моллюсков и акул, так и не удалось. На место срочно прибыли корабли береговой охраны КНР, вставшие между филиппинским эсминцем и китайскими судами. Война нервов между Манилой и Пекином продолжалась несколько дней, в ситуацию пришлось вмешаться президенту Филиппин Бенигно Акино-младшему и Госдепу США, призвавшему стороны «проявлять сдержанность и искать дипломатическое решение».

Хотя конфликта удалось избежать, напряженность вокруг рифа Скарборо не ослабевает. Представитель МИД КНР Лю Вэйминь заявил, что «остров Хуанъянь является исконно китайской территорией», и предупредил: «Мы призываем филиппинскую сторону не допускать новых инцидентов». В ответ его филиппинский коллега Рауль Эрнандес призвал китайскую сторону «прекратить вторжения и уважать наш суверенитет».

В разгорающийся конфликт вокруг богатых биоресурсами и углеводородами спорных районов Южно-Китайского моря де-факто втягивается и Россия. На прошлой неделе представитель МИД КНР Лю Вэйминь впервые позволил себе завуалированный выпад в адрес Москвы. Отвечая на вопрос о недавнем соглашении между «Газпромом» и вьетнамской госкомпанией PetroVietnam о совместном освоении лицензионных блоков 05.2 и 05.3 на шельфе Вьетнама (подробнее о сделке — см. «Ъ» от 6 апреля), китайский представитель фактически отчитал Москву: не называя «Газпром» впрямую, он призвал компании из третьих стран, не имеющих отношения к Южно-Китайскому морю, держаться в стороне от спорных районов и не участвовать в их освоении до разрешения территориального вопроса. Ранее КНР решительно возражала против участия в освоении вьетнамских нефтяных месторождений ведущей индийской госкомпании ONGC Videsh Limited.

Особую остроту ситуации придает то, что новые разногласия Москвы и Пекина вскрылись накануне прошедшей в Москве трехсторонней встречи глав МИДов России, КНР и Индии. Отвечая на вопрос «Ъ» о последних китайских демаршах, участвовавший в переговорах глава МИД Индии Соманахалли Маллайя Кришна назвал работу индийской компании ONGC Videsh Limited в регионе «сугубо коммерческой деятельностью, не имеющей никакой политической подоплеки». Министр сослался на заявление главы МИД КНР, который на недавней встрече АСЕАН был вынужден признать, что «не может быть никаких ограничений на торговлю и деловую активность в международных водах». По словам господина Кришны, работа индийских компаний в спорных районах Южно-Китайского моря продолжится.

Официальная реакция российской стороны на заявления МИД КНР пока не прозвучала. Тем не менее в третьей декаде апреля у побережья Китая в Желтом море пройдут совместные учения ВМФ России и ВМС КНР «Морское взаимодействие-2012». Эти учения плановые. Однако эксперты предупреждают: в нынешней ситуации обострения борьбы за контроль над ресурсами региона Китай вполне может использовать эти маневры для продвижения тезиса о том, что Россия играет с ним на одной стороне. Другой вопрос — выгодна ли такая трактовка самой России.


http://www.kommersant.ru/doc-y/1917327

dmr.nd.gov: Добыча нефти и газа. Ч. 1

Карта округов Северной Дакоты

North Dakota Drilling and Production Statistics

Monthly Production Report Publications

Chart of daily oil production with price per barrel

Chart of monthly MCF gas produced with price per MCF sold